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Thi s pa p er a nal yzes t h e sp atia l comp eti ti on i n commi ssio n fees b e-
t w een t w o matc h mak ers. These matc h mak ers serv e as mid dl emen b e-
t w een bu y ers and sell ers who are l o cated uni formly o n a circ le. The pro￿ ts
of th e matc h mak ers a re determi ned b yt h ei r resp ec t iv e mark et si zes. A
l i mited wi l li ngn ess to pa y i s i ncorp orated by means of reserv a tion pri ces. If
th e fractio n of b uy ers and sel lers i s un equal , th e matc h mak e r s ar e w i lli ng
to subs id ize t h e sh ort si de of th e mark et, whi l e the l on g si de i s ex pl oi t ed
co mpl etely , provi ded rese rv ati on pri ces are s u￿ci en tl y hi gh. C o mp eti tio n
i s th en c oncen tra ted entirel y on t h e sh ort si de. Wh en re serv ati on pri ces
ar e l o w, t w o l o cal monop ol ies wi ll emerge.
Keyw o r d s: Matc hi ng, mi ddl emen, spa t i al pri ce comp eti ti on.
￿
Th is r esea rc hi s p art of the VF-pro gra m" C o mpeti tion an dC o o pe r ati on"
y
Th e aut hor sw oul dl i k et ot h a nk Eric v a n Dam me, Rob Gil les, Piete rR u ys, Dolf T a lma n,
a nd an an on y mo us r efe ree for the ir v alu abl ec o mm en ts o np rev iou sd r afts of this pa pe r
z
C. L.J.P .v a nR a alte , Dep art men t of Econ om etr ics a nd Cen tER, Tilbu rg Uni v ers it y ,P . O.
B o x9 01 53, 500 0 LE T ilb ur g, The N e the rlan ds, e-m ail :c .l.j. p.v a nra alt e@kub .nl
x
H.M . W eb e rs, Depa rtm en to f Eco nom et rics an d Cen t ER, Tilb urg U n iv e rsit y ,P . O. B o x
9 01 53, 500 0 LE T ilb ur g, The N e the rlan ds, e-m ai l: h .m. webers@ku b.n l1
1 In tro du c ti on
In m an ym ark ets , in term ed i ati on pla ys an im p ort a n tr o le. In this pap e r, in-
term ediati on in bil ate ral m atc hing m a rk et s i s studied. In this t yp e of m ark e ts,
there are t w ot yp e s of ag en ts, eac ho f whic h s eeks to trade wi th an agen to ft h e
o the r t y pe.
T he ex i s tenc e o fa n i n te rm ed i ating institutio nm a y r educ e s earch cos ts as so ci-
a te d wi th ￿nding a suitabl e tradi n g partne r (se e, e.g ., Di am o nd (1984) for a
surv ey of se arc hl i te rature ). In te rm edia ti on i ns e a rc he c o nom i es m a y tak e place
f or instanc e through m o ne y (Kiy otaki and W ri gh t (198 9)). In this pap e r, i n te r-
m ed i atio nb y midd l emen is studied. The rol eo f m iddl em e n in search m ark ets
i s anal yze d b y , e.g. , Rubi ns tein a nd W ol insky (19 87), who de riv e c o existe nce
o f d i re ct and in term ed i ated trade , Bhattac hary a and Y a v a s (1993), who m o del
m iddl em en a s’ tr a de rs of l ast re sort’, and Y a v as (199 5).
Ess en tia ll y ,w e can d i st i ngui sh t w o di￿er en tt y pe s o f m iddl em e n, nam ely market
m a ker s and ma t ch makers (se e Y a v as ( 1 993) fo ra c o m parison). Mark et m ak ers
a r e actuall yi n v ol v ed in the tr a d e pro ce ss , in the s ense that they buy com m o di-
ti e s from se l lers , and re sell them to buy e rs. Match m ak er s are not in v olv ed i n
the tr a ding pro c ess ; the y just m a k e trade p o s sibl eb y bring ing buy ers and se l lers
to ge ther . T hi s pap e r stud i es a m ark et organi ze d b ym atc hm ak er s.
W e anal y z eam od el o f spatial c o m pet i ti on i n com m i s sio nf ee s be t w ee n t w o
m atc hm ak er s. W ed e v el op a Sal op (19 79) t yp e m o del o fc o m p e titi on o na
m ark et for one c o m m od i t y .I n o ur m o del, th ere are c on ti n uum p o pulati ons of
buy e rs and s ell e rs, unif orm l yd i s tributed o v e r a circu l ar cit y (se e al so W eb ers
(1 994)). Eac hs e l ler o wns o ne unit o fa ni nd i vi si ble com m o dit y , whi ch he de sires
to sell t o one of th e buy er s
1
. More o v er , eac h buy e r des i r es to b uy o ne unit. The
v al uations of buy e rs and se l lers f or the com m od i t y are ide n ti ca l.
Buy ers a n d sell er s h a v et om a k e u se of the s ervice s of one of the t w om atch
m ak ers i n orde r to t rade. If a buy er o r seller go es t o a m atch m ak er, he pa ys a
com m i s sio n fee to th e m atc hm ak e r, pro v ide d he i sm atc he d. Com m iss i on f ee s
a r e assu m e d to b e nonne g ativ e . Be si de s a com m iss i on fee , buy ers and se l lers
i ncu r a r el atio nal cost b y going t o a m atc hm ak e r. Thi si nc l u des costs of e ￿ort,
search, tr a ns p ortatio n, etc . The m a tch m ak e rs are di￿er en tia te d m axi m al ly
w ith r esp ec t to the r ela ti onal c osts. It is ass um e d that the m a tch m a k er s are
sym m et ri c in the se nse that if the fractions of buy er s and s ell er s a re t h e sa m e
f or b oth m atc hm ak e rs , the buy ers and se l lers get e qua l trade surpluse s at e a ch
m atc hm ak er .
1
Th ei ndi visib ilit ya ssum pt ion is r elax ed b yT re jos and W rig h t( 199 5).2
T h e fo cus of our m o de l is on the com p etiti on in com m ission f ee s be t w e en the
m atc hm a k e rs. The refore, the m ec hani sm b y whi ch t rade i s p erform ed, is not
m od el ed ex p l icitly . Such a m echa ni sm could b e a com pe ti tiv em ark e t (Shapl ey
a nd Sh ubik (19 72)), or bargai ning (R ubinst ein and W oli ns ky (1985 )) .
W e i n co rpo rate a lim ited wi ll ingness to pa yi n to the m od el ,i n the f orm of
res erv ati on price s. The res er v atio n price i ndicate s ho wm uc h a buy er or se l ler
i s wi lli ng t o sp e nd, i nt e r m so f t h ef ee a nd the r ela tional cost, in orde r to b e
m atc hed b ya m atc hm a k er . Res erv ati on prices i n￿ue nce the ’ p ote n ti al m ar-
k e ts’ of the m atc hm ak ers , b eing the fraction of buy er s or se l lers at a m atch
m ak er who se f ee a nd re l ati onal cost are co v ere d ful ly b y t he r ese rv ati on pr i ce .
F o l l o wi ng W e b ers (19 95), w e c an di st i nguish thre e di￿e ren t r egi m es of p ote n ti al
m ark et are a sa tg i v en price s: Str on g c omp etiti on , whi ch is the c a se i f the p o-
ten tia lm ark et are as of the t w om atch m ak e r sa tt h e s ep r i ce s h a v e a nonem pt y
i n te rse ction f orb o th t yp es of agen ts , we ak c omp etiti on ,i n c ase t he p ote n ti al
m ark et a r eas of the m atc hm ak ers at the se pri ce s h a v ea n o ne m pt yi n te rse ction
f or o n e o f t he t w ot yp es of agen ts and for the other t yp e the in ters ec ti on i s
ei t her a p oin t ore m pt y , and no c omp etiti on ,i n cas e the p oten tial m ark et are a s
o f the m atc hm ak ers a t t hese price s ha v ea n i n te rse ction whi ch i se i t her a p oin t
o r e m pt yf or b oth t y pes o fa ge n ts . T h e no tion of p o te n tia lm ark et are a si sa
g e n e rali z ati on of the one fo rm ulated b yG abs ze w icz and Thi s se (19 86), whi ch
ho lds for ’ z ero price s’.
T h e pro￿ts of t he m a tc hm a k e rs are det erm i ne d b y the i r r e spe ct i v em ark et
s i ze s. M ore pre cise l y ,w ea s sum e that e v ery buy e r and se l ler g o e s to the m atch
m ak er whose sum o f fee a nd r ela ti onal c o st i s the lo w e st. W ed on o ti nc l ude
a gen ts ’ bel iefs a bo ut the distribution of buy er s and se l lers o v er the m iddlem en,
be ca us e w ew an t to fo cus o n the com p etiti on in c o m m i ss i on fe es. If w e think
o f the situatio na sa t w o- s tag e gam e , in whic ht h em i ddlem en se t fee s in the
￿rst s tag e , and the buy ers a nd s ell er s c h oos e a m iddl em an in the s econd s ta ge
si m ul ta ne ously , the n um b e r of equil ibri a of this ga m ei sl arge. Thi si s cause d b y
the exter nal it y asso c i ate d with bil ate ral m atc hing: The surplus of ev ery m ark et
pa rt i ci pan ti sd e p e n d i ng on the di s tributi on of buy ers and se l lers o v e r the m atch
m ak ers . Si nc e the buy er s a nd se l ler s c ho ose a m atc hm ak er sim ultaneous l y ,n o
i n form ationi s a v ai labl ea b out this distributio n
2
. There fo r e,m a n y s trate g ies
supp ort an equil ibrium in the s econd s ta ge .
T h e pro￿t o fa m a tch m ak er i s de ter m ined b y t he m ini m um of the s i ze s o f
hi s p ote n ti al m ark et areas of buy e rs and sell e rs, b y the ass um pt i on that only
m atc he d ag en ts pa y the com m ission f e e. The refore, whe n m axim izing pro￿ts, a
m atc hm a k er e qua ls the buy er and seller f ra c tio ns he s erv e s. B y this prop er t y ,
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Buy ers an d selle rs run th e risk of n ot b ei ng m atc h ed .I n s o me sen se, this ris kc oul db e
r ela ted to the risk as so ci ated with the tim el yd eliv ery of produc ts ( Espin osa (19 92) ).3
the c a s e of u nequal de nsiti e s of sell er s a nd buy e rs alo ng the circle
3
, has to b e
di st i nguished f rom the e qual de nsit y case . If dens i ti e s are une qual ,n oc o m p eti-
ti on and w ea k com p etiti on c an onl y o c cur i n equil ibri um . If d ensities a r e e qual ,
strong com p etitio nm a ya l s o o c cur.
T w o in ter esting re sults fol lo wf rom the m od el . First , the r est ri ct i on on one
si de of the m a rk et i m pl ies that for s u￿ ci en tl yh i gh r ese rv ati on pr i ce s, t h e l ong
si de of the m ark et can b e ’ e xpl oi t ed’ c o m pl et el yb y the m iddlem en. Since the
short si de dete rm i ne s the m iddlem ens’ pro￿ts en tire l y ,i ti s not opti m al for the
￿rm s to com p ete f or the ag en ts on the long s i de . He nce , the ￿r m s ’ pro￿ts
tend to in￿nit yi f re ser v atio n pri c es b ec om el arge r and l arge r. A t the s am e
ti m e, the ag en ts on the short side of the m ark et m a ye n tire l y’ f r ee ride’, in the
sens e th a t they pa yaz e r oc o m m ission fee . In e qui li br i um , the m iddl em en e v en
desire to s ubsidi z e the se a gen ts . The p o si tiv ee ￿ e c to f the f e e so np o t e n ti al
m ark et ar eas is the n dom inati ng the negati v e e￿e ct on pr o ￿ts . W e re str i ct
o u rs e l v e s t o n o n- ne ga ti v e fees , a lthough t he m iddlem en ha v e a tende ncy to
subsidize. One m a y argue that explicit subsidies are not p erm itted. In the case
o f equal dens i ties , th e a sy m m etr y b e t w een the long and s hort si de of t he m ark et
d i s a p p ears c o m plete l y . Sec ond, a l arge am oun to f equil ibrium indet erm i na cy
i s cr e ate d f or e qual de nsi ti es . F or unequal d ensities, t hi sp r o bl em do es not
oc cur , exc ept for a no n-gen eric s et of pa ra m et ers . The case o f equal dens i ties
i ts elf i s non-gene ri c, h o w ev er , s o that t he i nde ter m inacy do e s not c a us e to o
ser i ous problem s. The case o f equal de nsiti es i s anal yz ed in orde r to pr o vide a
b enchm ark.
T h e r em a inder of this pap e r is organized as fol lo ws . In S ect i on 2, the m od el i s
f orm ul ate d. I n Sec ti on 3, the equili bria of th e price -se tti ng gam e are deriv ed,
f or the c a s es of e qua l dens i ties and unequal de nsiti es . Sect i on 4 pro vi de s a
c haracte ri z ati on of the equil ibri a. Fina ll y , in Sec ti on 5, c o m parativ e statics i s
p erform e d bet w een t he case s of e qual dens i ti es a n d un equal de nsiti es .
2 T h e Mo de l
In th e m od el the re are three di ￿e re n tp a rt i es . First, the re are t w od i ￿e re n t
t y pe s o fa g e n ts . Agen ts of t yp e 1 are wi ll ing t o se l l a uni to f ah o m og e neous
i ndivi si b l e go o d and agen ts of t yp e 2 are wil li ng to bu y a uni to ft h i s goo d. In
o r der tot r a de t hey nee d a third part y ,s a yi n t erm ediari e s, whose s ervice it is to
m atc h the se l ler s and the buy er s. Thes e i n te rm edia ri e s are r efer red to as ￿rm s.
3
It is oft en assu me di n the lit era tur e, t ha te ithe rt he sup ply is no t bin din go rt he de ma nd
f unc tio ns o ft h e￿ rms are exo gen ou s. I no ur m od el, t he ’dem an df unc tio ns’, i .e., t he p ot en t ial
m ar k et s, ar e end oge nou s. T he m od el can be seen a sa ’ stra teg ic ma rk e tc o v e rag e’ t ype.
S tra teg ic m ark et co v er age t hro ugh adv ert ising was c onsi der ed b yB o y e r and M o rea ux (1 99 2).4




to a ge n t s of t yp e i, i 2f 1 ; 2 g , for pro vi ding t hi s ser vi ce . L et ￿
j
de no t e the






> for j 2f 1 ; 2 g .
A g e n ts of t yp e i, i 2f 1 ; 2 g , are lo cate d u ni form ly a long a c i rc l ew i th p e rim e ter 1.
T h e de nsi t y e qual s ￿ for t yp e 1 agen ts and ￿ fo rt y p e2a g en ts, wher e ￿; ￿ > 0.
F or e ase o f e xp ositi on w el et ￿ ￿ ￿ ,s o p o te n tia ld e m and is a tl ea s t as l arge a s
po te n tia l supply , although all re sul ts w i ll hol da sw ell i nc a se ￿> ￿ .F i rm s are
l o cate d sym m e trical ly a long the circle, s o t hey are lo cated at m a xim um di s tance




Both t yp e s of ag en ts f ac e ide n ti ca ll i ne ar r ela ti onal costs with uni t cost t>
0 .F ur ther m ore ag en ts o ft yp e i, i 2f 1 ; 2 g ,h a v e r es er v ation price p
i
fo r the
relati onal costs and f ee s c harge d b ya n y of the t w o￿ r m s, i .e., they w a n tt o p a y
u pt oa n a m oun t p
i
for the ￿rm s’ se rvi ce s. T he re se r v ati on pri c es are assu m ed
t o be g i v en e xo gen o us l y .
It m a y happ en w ell that the fee s o r the r ela ti onal cost s a r e so high that the
res erv ati on price cannot co v e r the se.
D e￿n i ti on 2. 1 The p ot en ti al market ar e ao f ￿ r m j , j2f 1 ; 2 g ,f o r ag ents of
t yp e i , i 2f 1 ; 2 g , a t pric e ￿
i
j





), i s the set o f agen ts of typ e i,
f or which the su m of the r elationa l c ost an d the pri c e ￿
i
j
char ge d by ￿rm j do es
not exc e e d the r ese r vation p r ic e.


















































i 2 f 1; 2 g.
T h e notio n of p oten tial m ark et are as i s use d to des crib e the s truc ture o f com -
p etitio na m o ng the t w o ￿rm s.
D e￿n i ti on 2. 2 A tg i ve n p r ic es ther e is str on g c omp eti tion if t he p otenti a l mar-
ket ar e as o f the two ￿ r ms at these pri c es have a non empty interse cti o n for b ot h
t yp es o f a gents, ther ei sw e ak c omp etit ion i f the p otential mar ket ar e as of t he
￿r ms at t h ese p r ic es have a non empty i nt er se ction for on e of the t wo typ es of
agents and for the other typ e the inter se ction is e i ther a p oi n t or empty, and
t he r ei s n oc om p eti tion at these pr ic es if the p otential market ar e as of the ￿rms
at these pric es h ave an interse cti on w hich is ei the r a p oint or emp t y for b ot h
t yp es o f ag ents.
T he si ze of the p o te n tia lm a rk e t are a of ￿rm j , j 2f 1 ; 2 g , of agen ts o ft yp e i,
i 2f 1 ; 2 g , at pri ce ￿
i
j
is the tota l length o f t he in te rv al of ag en ts o ft yp e i fo r5
w hi c h the s um o f the re l atio nal c o st to ￿ r m j and the price of ￿r m j , ￿
i
j
,d o e s
no te x ce ed th e r e se rv atio n price p
i
. The m ini m um of the s i ze s of the p ote n ti al
m ark et a r eas of ￿rm j of ag en ts of t yp e 1 and t yp e 2 i s cal led the market size


































I t i s e asy to v erify that the p oten tial m ark et are a s of the t w o￿ r m s for agen ts























































w eh a v e the situati on of no c om p etiti on.




















































w eh a v e the situatio no f w eak com -
p etitio n, where the ￿rm s com pe te f or the sellers . The m ark et s i z e of ￿rm j ,

























































w e ha v e the situatio no f w eak com -
p etitio n, wher e the ￿rm sc o m pet e f or the buy e rs. The m a rk e t size of ￿rm j ,






























w ith k 6= j 2f 1 ; 2 g .


























w eh a v e the situatio no f s trong


































w ith k 6= j 2f 1 ; 2 g .6
3 Equi l ibri a
Eac h ￿rm j , j 2f 1 ; 2 g ,c ho ose s fees ￿
i
j
, i 2f 1 ; 2 g ,a st o m ax im i ze i ts pr o ￿ ts. W e
de￿ne ￿rm j ’s s trate g y ￿
j
2 ￿= [ 0 ; p
1
] ￿ [0; p
2
]a s the tu pl e of price s c harged b y






). The gam e
i n whi ch ￿rm s sim ulta n eously cho o s e price s, i s refer red to as G .F or e q ui li brium
a nalysi sw e use t he Nash e q ui li brium c once pt.











































Bec ause ￿rm sa r e lo cate d sym m etricall yi tm ak es se nse to lo ok fo ra n e q ui li brium
i n whic h b oth ￿r m sc ho ose t he sam ep r i c es. Moreo v er for b oth ￿r m s dem and
a nd s uppl ym ust b e equal i ne q ui li brium . This i s state d i n the f oll o wi ng lem m a.






) of the g ame G, demand an d sup pl y
ar e e qua l for b ot h￿ r ms.
P ro of Supp os e ￿ rst that d em a nd is gre ater than supply . The n incr easing the
f ee f or the buy e rs incr ease s pro￿ts b e cause s upply wil l not c hange. Su pp ose ne xt
tha td e m and i ss m all er th a n supply . Then i nc re a si ng the price for t he se l lers
i nc rease s pro￿ts . So de m and m ust equal supply in equil ibrium .
F or the situati on ￿< ￿ e qui li br i um outc om e s ar e giv e n in P rop ositi on 1 and
Prop ositi on 2.
P rop o si ti on 1 L et ￿< ￿ b e given an d l et p
1
￿
























































































































































(2￿ +3 ￿) t
4 ￿
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P ro of Se e App endix.
























=< ’; 0 > wit h ’ 2 [








P ro of Se e App endix.
T ob ec o m plete and to p ro vide a b e nc hm a rk w ea l so gi v e the Nash e qui li br i ai n
case th e a ge n ts’ de nsities are t he sam e, i .e., ￿ = ￿ . This re qui re m en t com pl i-
cates the p ro o fs , b ec ause no wt h e s i tu a ti on of s trong c om pet i ti on can o c cur in
equi libri um , whi ch giv e s rise to a l ot of indete rm i nacies . Conse quen tly the re are
sev e ral ranges of res erv atio n price s for whi ch t here exist con tin ua of equi libri a.




























, j 6= k 2 f1; 2g, then ther e exist sa





































































































P ro of Se e App endix.























) for t h e

















P ro of Se e App endix.













































) f o r the game G












P ro of Se e App endix.
In the app e ndix it is sho wn t ha t the s et of equil ibria c harac terize d i n Prop osi-
ti ons 3, 4 and 5 is exhaus ti v e in case ￿ = ￿ .8
4 C ha ra c te ri z at i on of equi li bri a
In orde r to di s cuss the di￿e ren tt yp es of e qui li bria w el ab e l the di￿er en t r egi ons
o f re ser v atio n pri ce s i nP r o po si tions 1 and 2 as in Fig ur e 4. 1 and sum m a ri z e the
res ul ts o f the pr evio us sec ti on. F or the c a se ￿< ￿ w er e f e r to T abl e4 .1.
Are a F ee s Pro￿ts
I <






















































































































T a b le 4.1 : The di ￿e re n t r egi ons in cas e ￿< ￿ .
W e c a n d i s t i n g u i sh b et w ee n thr ee a r eas of no com pe ti tion and thre e are as of
w ea k co m pet i ti on. It is c he c k ed e asi ly that t he corr esp o nd i ng f e es and pro￿ts



















: No co mp et it io n.




, the re ser v atio n pri c e of at l e ast one of the t yp es
o fa ge n ts i ss o l o w, that b oth ￿rm s est a bli sh ’ lo cal m o nop oli e s’. In are a I , the
di ￿e ren ces b e t w ee n the re se rv a tion pr i c es of the se l lers and bu y e rs are su￿cien tly
l o w to obtain an e qui li brium with b oth f e es p ositiv e . The fee s a re su c h that
a gen ts w i th a higher re se rv ation pr i ce a lso pa y a higher fee . This prop er t y




,i n whic h case s the di￿er enc es b e t w ee n
res erv ati on price s are r ela tiv ely hi gh. In the se are a s , the ￿rm se v en a c tual ly
desire to subs i dize the agen ts wi t h the lo w e st r es erv ati on pr i c e. Since w e re str i ct
o ur selv es to non-negati v ef e es, this m e ans that thes e agen ts are ser v ed f or fre e.
T he w i ll ingnes s to subs i dize t he ag en ts with the lo w e st re ser v ation pr i c e com es
f rom the m ark e t exte rnal it y a s soc i ate d with m a tchi ng. In orde r to m ak e a pro￿t,
bo t h sellers a nd b uy e rs are nee ded. F or s u￿ ci en tl y di￿e ren t r ese rv ati on price s,
the de m and e ￿e ct of attract i ng agen ts i s str o nge r than the negativ e price e￿ ec t
o n pro￿ts. Only the agen ts with t he hi ghes t r es erv ati on pri ce i n that c ase bring




































































Fi gure 4 .1: The di￿er en tr e g ions i n c ase ￿< ￿ .




: W ea k com p eti ti on .




, the r ese rv a ti on pr i c es are su￿cien tly hig h to c reate
a situatio no f w ea k com p etitio n . In area II I, the situatio ns of w e ak and no
com p etiti on coincide.
In a re a II I, the re ser v atio np r i ce s a re st i ll s u￿ ci en tl yl o wa nd cl o s et oe a ch
o t h e rt oh a v e b oth t yp e of agen ts to b e tr eated ’ sym m etricall y’. The se l lers
l o cate d at a distanc e
1
4
f ro m the ￿rm sh a v e a z er o sur pl us . A f ra ct i on ￿ ￿ ￿
o f the buy e rs is not ser v ed. Firm s do not tr y to c a pt ure the se b uy e rs, since
dem a nd and sup pl ym us t b e e qua li n e qui li br i um .10




,’ sy m m etry’ b e t w e en buy e rs and s ell e rs disapp e a rs . No w,




bo t h ￿r m sc l aim a p o si ti v e sur pl us . The sell er s ca n tak e adv a n tage of the i r
po si ti on i n t he m a rk e t, b ec a us e the y f orm the short s i de o f the m ark e t. The
negati v ep r i c e e￿ ec t o np r o ￿t s i sm ore than com p ens a te d b y t h e po si tiv e e ￿e ct
o n the m ark et s i ze b y attracting the se l ler s.
T h e adv an tageous m a rk e t p ositi on of a se l ler in case o fh i gh re se rv ation pri ce s
i s e x e r cised m axi m al ly i na re a IV
b
. S i m i lar to the area II
b
, t h e ￿ rm s desire
to su bsi di z e the se l ler s. This i m pli e s that t he se l lers are ser v ed f or free . The
pro￿tsi nIV
b
a r e i n cre a si ng in the re se rv a tion price of the buy ers , wi th n o
u p pe r b ound. Since c o m pet i tion on the l ong s i de of the m ark et nev er o cc urs in
equi libri um , t he buy ers can b e cha rg ed m axim al ly .





as b efore (with ￿ = ￿ subs ti tut ed) and t he areas
~













i n Fi gure s 4. 2a and 4. 2b, wi th c o r res p ondi ng f e es and pro￿ts as i nT a ble 4. 2,















































































































































T a ble 4.2 : The di ￿e re n t r egi ons in cas e ￿ = ￿ .




do not cha nge wi th r esp ec t to the s i tuation ￿< ￿ , since
no c o m pet i tion o c cur s i ne q ui li brium . The a r eas asso c i ate d wi th com pe ti tion
do c ha nge , ho w ev er . W e ak and st rong c o m pet i ti on coincide i n are a
~

















I n a r e a
~
I II , t h e s i t uatio ns of c om pet i ti on a nd no c om p e titi on coi nc i de . Al-
tho u g h
~
I I I i s s hap eds i m i la rl y as are a II I i n Fig ur e 4. 1, i ti sl a rg er , h o w ev er .
I n o rd e r to ge t com p etitio n, the re ser v atio n pri ce s h a v e to b e larger. The r ea-
son is that for the case ￿<￿ , the negativ ep r i c e e￿e ct on pr o ￿t s b y the lo w er
f ee s c ha rg e d u nder com pe ti tion is dom inated, si n ce onl y com pe ti tion for se l lers
can o ccu r i ne q ui li brium .F i rm s c an ’ a￿ord’ l o w er fee s fo r the se l ler s al re ady
f or lo w e r r ese rv a ti on price s, s i nc e for buy er s f e es rem ai nm onop ol istic. In case





























































































F or the c a s e of str o ng com pe ti tio n , di￿e ren tt y pes o f con tin u a of equili bria




,f o ro ne con tin uu m of e qui li br i a the
f e es are divi de d i na na rb i tr a ry w a y , pro vided their sum i s t. Exploi tatio no f
o n e o f t h e m ark et sides do e s not o c cur i n this equil ibrium . Notice that al so a
’ f a i r ’ t r eatm en to fa ge n ts , th a t is, ’ =
t
2
, i s a llo w ed as an equil ibrium .
Expl oita ti on of o ne of the m ark et s i de s c om e s bac k in the t w o othe r c o n tin ua








. In thes e ar eas e qui li br i ae x i st i n whi ch
o ne t yp e o fa g en ts i s s erv e d for f r ee and the other t yp e i s e xpl oi t ed com pl e tely .




, wher e t here is an upp er b ound on the pro￿ts, th us co e xi st








, whe re ther e e xi s t equil ibria fo r whi ch the























Fi gure 4.2b: D i￿er en tr e g i ons in case ￿ = ￿ .13
5 C om pa rati v e stati cs
In order to pr o vide som em ore i ns i gh t in the di￿e renc es and s i m i lari ties b e t w ee n
the case ￿<￿ and the case ￿ = ￿ w e wil l disc uss equil ibrium pricing and
equi libri um pro￿ts i nm o r e de tai li n this se ct i on. In orde r to use the s ta nd a rd









= p, the e q ui li brium
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< 0 ; p ￿
￿ t
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> i f p ￿
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Figure 5.1 :E q ui li brium fe es in case ￿< ￿ for j 2f 1 ; 2 g .14













































<’ ; t ￿ ’> if p ￿
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<’ ; 0 > if p ￿
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< 0;’ > if p ￿
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Figure 5.2 :E q ui li brium fe es in case ￿ = ￿ for j 2f 1 ; 2 g .15




tha t th ere are ev en thre e t y pes o f con tin ua fo r p ￿
5 t
4
, whi ch giv e s rise to a
co ordi na tion probl em . Although o ur purp ose i s not to sol v et h i s coo rd i nation
















b enchm ark f or the com pa ri so n bet w e en the case ￿< ￿ and the case ￿ = ￿ .
T o our opi nio n the re are se v e ral reas o ns that a re i nf a v o u r of the fai r soluti on.
Fi rs tl y , t he sol ut i on f or p ￿
3t
4
is al so fa ir. Sec ondl y , the fai rs o l ution pr o vides
al o w er b o u nd on the ￿rm s’ pro￿ts whic h s eem s suitabl e from a so cial p o in to f
v iew. Thi rd l y , the fa ir sol ution is e qual to the sol ut i on for t he standard c i r cula r
m od el ( s ee W e b er s (199 5)).
R e cal l that the fa ir s ol ution c a n b e obtai ne d thr o ugh m axi m izing pro￿ts, whi ch
i s pri ce ti m es m ark et size. This e ss en tia ll ym eans that, in cas e ￿ = ￿ , the re
i sn o m a tc hi n g probl em f o r the so c i al pla n ner. In case ￿<￿ ,t h i s is not true
i f re ser v ation price s are hi gh e noug h, b ecaus e the so c i al pl anne r the n al so i s
c o n c er n e d a bo u t the a ge n t s that are not se rv ed.
Fi rm s’ pro￿ts are dra wn in Fi gure 5. 3.
If the r ese rv a ti on pri c e is relati v el yl o w, i. e. , p ￿
( ￿ +4￿ )t
8 ￿
, w e are in r egi ons
I ; I I I ; I V
a
in case ￿ <￿ , and i nr e g i ons I and
~




, pro￿ts are higher fo r t he situati on ￿<￿ than f or the s i tuation
￿ = ￿ .
If the res er v ation pr i ce i sr e l ativ ely high, i .e., p ￿
(￿ +4 ￿ ) t
4 ￿
, w e a r e in r egi on IV
b
i n












i n case ￿ = ￿ .F o r p ￿
( ￿ +4￿ )t
4￿
, pro￿ts
a r e hi ghe r for the s i tuatio n ￿< ￿ than for the situatio n ￿ = ￿ . Com pe ti tion
f or the sell e rs b ecom es m ore s ev er e i n t he l atte r cas e, whic hl o w e rs pro￿ts .
If the r ese rv ati on price s a re i n t erm ediate, i .e.,
(￿ + 4 ￿ )t
8￿
￿ p ￿
(￿ + 4 ￿ )t
4￿
, pro￿ts are


































































Fig ur e 5. 3: Equil ibrium pro￿ts .17
6 App e nd i x
In order to pr o v e the prop ositi ons w e ￿ rs t s pec i f y the f our relev an tm a xim ization
probl em s . In the re g ion of price s whe re there is no c om p e titi on ￿r m sc ho ose







































































In the r egi on of price s where there i sw eak com p etiti on and t he ￿rm s com p ete











































































In the r egi on of price s where there i sw eak com p etiti on and t he ￿rm s com p ete


























































































































































P ro of of P rop os it io n1
F i r s t consider th e situati on of no c om p e titi on. Be cause de m and and supply

















m axi m i z ati on problem (6. 1) for j 2f 1 ; 2 g . Note t ha to ne of the cons trai n ts



























































































) wi t h k 6= j 2 f 1; 2 g.
















. The ￿rs t order conditi ons fo r pro￿t m axi m i za ti on for ￿rm j , j 2f 1 ; 2 g ,

































































































































































































￿ 0 ;l 2f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 g :














































2 ( ￿ + ￿ )






















































































T he l ast thing w eh a v e t o d oi st oc he c k whe the r or not ( a n yo f ) the se soluti ons
can b e i m pro v e d up on. F o ra ll the s ol utions it hol ds that deviati ng b y s etting
a hig he r price f or the sell e rs (and c o ns eque n tl ya l s o for the buy er s) de cre a se s
pro￿ts. The m o re i n ter es ti ng s i tu a tion is devia ting b y set ti ng a l o w er price fo r
the s ell e rs, whic h of cour se c annot o cc ur in case the o t her ￿ rm charges pri ce s














; 0 >,d e v i ating b y s etting
al o w er price fo r the s ell e rs dec rease s pro￿ts, b ec a us e dem and c a nnot i nc re a se .










>, deviati ng b y se tting a lo w e r price







. F i nal ly , if t he other
￿rm charges <











>, deviati ng b y se tting a lo w e r price

























Next, consider t he situatio no fw ea k co m p e titi on. B ecaus e de m and and supply




















i n to m a xim ization probl e m (6. 2) for j 6= k 2f 1 ; 2 g . W en e e d n o t consider
m axi m i z ati on p robl em ( 6 .3) b e cause ￿< ￿ .I f w e denote the v ec tor of Lag ra nge





, the c orre sp onding Lagrangi an for ￿rm j , j 2f 1 ; 2 g ,











































































































). Firm j , j 2f 1 ; 2 g th us w an ts to







) with r espe ct t o ￿
1
j





. T h e ￿ rs to r der conditi ons



































































































































































































































￿ 0 ;l 2f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 g :

























































































Fi nal ly w eh a v et oc he c k whe ther o rn o t (an y of ) the se sol ut i o n sc a nb ei m pr o v ed
up on. As w eh a v e see n b e f ore w eh a v et o i m p ose the additi onal require m en t





( ￿ +￿) t
2 ￿











Bec ause ￿<￿ , the si tu a ti on of s trong c om p e titi on cannot o cc ur. Com bi ning
thes e re sults yi el ds Prop ositi on 1.
Q. E. D.











let the o th er ￿rm ’ s strate gy b e g iv en b y <’ ; 0>
w ith ’ 2 [







] . Deviati ng b y set ti n gal o w er price f or the se l lers
cannot i nc re a s e pr o ￿t s, b e cause the price f or th e buy er s is z ero. Devi ating
b y sett i ng a (li tt l e) h i ghe r price fo r the se l lers , s a y ’ +￿ w i th ￿ ￿ 0, and
conse quen tly se tti n g the hi ghes t p os si bl e price fo r the buy ers , i .e., ￿
2














, re sults i np r o ￿ts equal to (’ + p
2
+













w hi c h a re m axi m a l for ￿ = 0 b e cause ’ ￿
(￿ +2 ￿) t
4 ￿
. D e v i a ti ng b y s etting a m uch















res ul ts i n p ro￿ts
2￿
t









￿ ’ ￿ ￿), whi ch i s nev er














P ro of of P rop os it io n3
F or ￿ = ￿ the soluti on t o the si tu a ti on of no com pe ti tion i s the sam ea sf o r
￿< ￿ . The onl yd i ￿e re nce wi t h the ￿rs t part of the pro of of Prop ositi on 1 i s


























> cannot b e
i m pro v e d up on f or a l arge r range of res erv ati on pri ce s, i . e. ,f or al l r es er v ation







































+ ￿). The deriv ativ eo f t hese pr o ￿t s with res p ec t t o ￿ i s

























>, devia ting b y se tting hi gher

























￿ 4￿ . Thi sm eans






P ro of of P rop os it io n4a n dP rop os it io n5
C ons i de r the situati on of strong com p etitio n . Be cause dem and and supply ha v e












in to m a xim ization
probl e m (6. 4) for j 6= k 2f 1 ; 2 g .I f w e denote th e v ect o ro fL a grange m ul ti-


































































































T h e ￿r st orde r c o nd i tions for pro￿t m axi m izati on for ￿r m j , j 2f 1 ; 2 g , can b e










































































































































































































￿ 0 ;l 2f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 g :








































































T he l ast thing w eh a v e t o d oi st oc he c k whe the r or not ( a n yo f ) the se soluti ons
can b e im pr o v ed up o n.22



























. If a ￿rm devia te s b y se tting s l igh tl yl o w er prices , sa y ￿ ￿ ￿
a nd ￿ ￿ ￿f or s o m e￿ > 0 , pro￿ts are ( ￿ + ￿ ￿ 2￿ )(
t
2
+ ￿). The deriv ativ eo f
thes e p ro￿ts wi th re sp e ct to price s i se q ua lt o ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
1
￿ 4￿ ,s o d e v i ating b y
sett i ng l o w e r prices is not optim al as l ong a s ￿ + ￿ ￿ t.S i m i larly w e ￿nd that
devi ating b y s ett i ng hig he r price s is not opti m al as long a s ￿ + ￿ ￿ t. Com bi ning
thes e res ul ts g iv es that ￿ + ￿ = t. If prices i nc rease m ore , th e situati on o fn o







￿ 2 ￿ .P r o ￿t s a r e equal






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿). One c an c heck that the deriv a tiv eo f
thes e pro￿ts is ne g ativ ea t ￿
￿
, so devia ti ng to t he situati on of no com pe ti tion
cannot b e optim al. N ext consider the situatio n wher e one of the t w o price s i s
zer o . Then w en e e d o nly cons i de r de vi atio ns b y s etting hi ghe r pr i c es. As sho wn
b efore this m eans that ￿ + ￿ ￿ t.N o te that the s i tuation whe re b o t h pri ce s











. As sh o wn i n P rop ositi on 3, thi s can o nly b e Nas h








Q. E . D.23
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